Asceticism and the Electronic Media Technophilia and Technophobia in the Perspective of Christian Philosophy
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The traditional treatment of numbness of the senses (hebetudo sensus) treats it
as a vice. NOTE 1 It is related to habitual immersion in sexual pleasure
(luxuria). By extension, habitual immersion in any pleasure will cause a certain
dullness of mind. By further extension, any focussing of attention, any
immersion in an object of appetite and cognition, will lead to a habitual
deficit in other areas. When I am immersed in pleasure, then very spontaneously
I become inattentive or numb to all else. The immediacy of pleasure may
overwhelm my awareness. The memory of pleasure may draw my attention from
whatever I was thinking about, from the situation here and now, and may make
sustained reasoning difficult. For this reason, luxury (in the broad and current
sense of the word) breeds a sort of narcosis and lack of knowledge that is
considered a vice.
It belongs to the fullness of being human that one should be in touch with
reality, not alienated from reality whether by vivid sensual memories or
compelling anticipation. Wh 959g623j ile a sort of numbess may come upon me as the result
of a flood of pleasure, or a retrieved memory of a pleasure, I may find it
desirable or even necessary to cultivate a habitual numbness. This is especially
true in an artificial environment, the technological and electronically enhanced
environment in which we presently live. If I remain attentive and open to all
the information that comes my way, I will be lost in a sea of meaninglessness.
Information in-forms me. Every time I am attentive to something, my mind takes
on that thing, becomes that thing, and so in a media environment, a normal or
enhanced state of attention makes me into an unwilling Proteus: I become nothing
but an endless series of trivial forms. The key to dealing with this sort of
environment is to become numb in such a way as not to be enchanted by the
ripples in the river of information. In this way, by numbness to compelling
details, I may become aware of larger patterns of meaning that would otherwise
elude me. A common metaphor in the English language is that one is not able to
see the forest for the trees. Occasionally, in order to see a large image, it is
necessary to slightly unfocus one's eyes. An analogous habit must be developed
with regard to the artificially enhanced information environment. NOTE 2
Love has a dual relation to knowledge. The first relation is that we love
nothing unless we know it , at least in a vague and circumscriptive way. NOTE 3
The second relation is that we seek to know things in a more than casual manner
because we are attracted by them. The English term "interest" (inter + esse)
indicates a sort of love. Attentive knowledge involves interest. Interest also
implies a way of existing. The inherent metaphor is that the knower is in the
midst of the thing, penetrating its "noumenon", or that the thing is in the
knower (a more classical metaphor). The object of knowledge attracts me and
evokes within me a strong desire to know it, and so it becomes my attention
itself. In another way, I seek to penetrate its depths and to know its intimate
details. Of all the senses, it is perhaps touch that culminates knowledge. We
may peer through lenses mounted on machines at the strange coasts and valleys of
other planets, but ultimately we wish to place our feet and our hands on the
land that we see. The object of interest may reveal only a few superficial
layers of appearances, and in a way there may not be very much to it. Even so,
an object such as a pebble or a tapeworm may draw the attention of the student
of nature for his entire life. Any real thing may become an object of interest
and thus of love.
In conclusion, some knowledge is undesirable because it is untimely. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ??????/ The
teleology of human knowledge and learning is not towards acquiring a permanent
mass of facts. In order to learn and order our knowledge, we quite spontaneously
forget things. We throw away the ladders of knowledge, the fact that our
knowledge is aspective and abstract places a natural limit on what we can know,
and on what we can foresee. Our very nature forbids knowledge that exceeds our
nature. In turn, the choice to know some things excludes the knowledge of
others. Positive directives that we should know things such as the common good,
the meaning of life, that we should know friends, imply prohibitions against
being immersed in a curiosity that would render this impossible.
18 de Febrero de 2003
Asceticism and the Electronic Media Technophilia and Technophobia in the
Perspective of Christian...
MEDIUM IS MESSAGE
Every thing that acts acts for an end. It is easy to reduce all man's
actions to the desire for happiness. The ultimate purpose of our actions
is the reason for all the intermediate purposes. To understand the meaning
of McLuhan's phrase "The Medium is the Message", we need to look to the
philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas. Marshall McLuhan wrote in a letter to
J.M. Davey, in the office of Prime Minister Trudeau:
It turns out then, that my communication theory is Thomistic to the core.
It has the further advantage of being able to explain Aquinas and
Aristotle in modern terms. We are the content of anything we use, if only
because these things are extensions of ourselves. (15)
Human cognition is primarily and objectively aimed at knowing the forms of
material things. This is the fundamental realism of human cognition. The
knowledge of concepts is not the primary purpose of cognition, but it is
through concepts that we know things. Only after we know things, can we
then reflect and ask how we know. It is then that we become aware of the
mediating role of the concept. The concept is something that necessarily
lies between the object of knowledge and the judgment of the intellect. To
lie between is to be a medium. There are more than one media between the
object itself and the act of judgment that is the final end of knowledge
or "message". In bodily sight, light itself intermediates, then the sense
impression or vision in the eye, and finally an act of perceiving
consciously what the physical sense is providing. In mental sight, the
light of the mind making things known is a medium, as is the concept or
species in the intellect, and then the mind makes a relation between the
species or concept and reality in an act of judgment, as the mind acts as
a mirror of reality, which is another sense in which there is a medium in
cognition. (16) It is normal for these media to remain invisible during
objective cognition. If someone says, "There is a fire in the building,"
we do not turn our attention to the mediating role of words and concepts,! ! ! !
but to a real and impending danger, and act accordingly.
However, whenever we know something, we simultaneously know that we know.
This is called concomitant reflection, which means that it is an act of
reflection that always and necessarily accompanies objective cognition. It
is the essential element of consciousness. Normally this reflection forms
the background of cognition. We do not normally remind ourselves or others
of what is implicit, as in saying "I know there is a fire" instead of
"There is a fire." The mind or soul is not always aware of itself as
separate or distinct from other things. (17) Self knowledge may not always
exist in act (with attention focused on the soul), but, through
concomitant reflection, it always exists in potency. When the soul sees
its act, it sees itself. When I see myself thinking, I see myself. In this
way, the medium becomes the message.! ! ! ! ! ! !! This may be further extended as one
moves from a knowledge of oneself as an image to a knowledge of God as Him
to whose image we are created. Through the act of reflection the media
themselves become the message, and so we have the seeds of McLuhan's
theory of communication and its effects in the teaching of Aquinas.
Marshall McLuhan went further in saying that we are unaware of the role of
the various artificial communication media without an act of reflection. ! ! !!!
---EX::::The printed word "American Flag" and the flag itself are both media of
communication. The printed word, however, does not evoke an emotional
response in an American, whereas the actual flag, or a picture of it,
does. The media of communication affect the way in which we receive the
communication, and so the media themselves bear a message. We can find
some precedents for McLuhan's observation in the philosophical tradition.
Plato tells a fable about the invention of writing. (18) When the Egyptian
god Theuth invented writing, he presented his invention to the King of
power of
memory. The king of
cause men to lose their memory, since they would simply write things down
and forget them. Likewise, printed words could fall into the possession of
anyone, who then can repeat them and appear wise without knowing what they
mean. The spoken word comes from the mind of a teacher, and where the
teacher's message is unclear, the disciple can ask him. Written words,
however, do not speak when we ask them questions.
Aquinas asks whether divine realities should be veiled by obscure and
novel words. (19) In teaching, the teacher must see that the disciple does
not learn things before he is ready. His words should be measured to help
rather than hinder his students. He also has the responsibility of
preventing people of bad will from receiving things which are difficult to
understand. As Our Lord says, "Do not through what is holy to the dogs."
In speaking it is possible to be discrete.-----ORAL SI SCRIS CA MEDIU DE TRNSMITERE A SMS--- We can say things to the wise
that we do not mention to the crowds. A written book, however, can fall
into the hands of anyone, and so it is not possible to preserve the truth
by silence from distortion or misuse. It is possible to express difficult
realities under new words, so that even if the wrong person reads the
book, he will not make any progress
Aquinas also addresses the question of why Our Lord did not write down his
doctrine. (20) The greatest teachers among the gentiles, Pythagoras and
Socrates, did not write anything. What is heard impresses itself in the
soul of the listener, and what is written is for the purpose of reading.
Our Lord taught as one who had power (Mt. 7, 29), not as the scribes and
pharisees. Also, the excellence of Christ's doctrine could not be
contained by mere written words, as John the Apostle says that the world
itself could not contain all the books that would have to be written to
tell of the things that Christ did. If Christ had written things down,
many would think that there is no more to his doctrine that what is
contained in scripture. It could also be noted that it is not merely the
number of things that Christ did and taught that cannot be contained by
mere written words, but also the quality. When something happens that is
utterly unlike anything else that happened, we find that the words we use
are inadequate, since words evoke images drawn from common experience.
In a similar argument, Aquinas teaches us that the New Law is not a
written law. (21) The Law of Moses was written in tablets, but the Law of
Christ is written in men's hearts. The New Law is principally the grace of
the Holy Spirit which is given to Christ's faithful. This law is nothing
other than the very presence of the Holy Spirit. The things which are
written in Holy Scripture are not the New Law itself, but things which
dispose us to believe in the New Law, or give us specific directions to
how we should use the grace which is the New Law.
McLuhan conjectures that the Protestant idea of sola scriptura was the
result of the new media of the printing press. When the scriptures were
passed on in hand-written documents, it was easier to understand that the
document was a medium. When thousands of books could be printed in exactly
the same way, this technical power so impressed people that they idolized
the technology, so that the power of the printing press seemed to have
more authority than the living authority of the Magisterium.
Finally, Aquinas considered the role of music in communication. (22) The
same words have a different effect when spoken and when sung. Music has an
emotional effect, both upon the singer and upon the listener, and so by
the use of music our hearts are drawn to God. Various melodies have
different effects on the emotions of those who sing and listen, a fact
known to Pythagoras. The melody and mode of singing is merely a medium,
but the medium itself carries a message.
HEBETUDO SENSUS and the NEED FOR ASCETICISM
The more necessary the object of an appetite for human life, the stronger
will that appetite be.! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!! The stronger the appetite, the more does it require
the control of reason. Asceticism aims at restoring man's internal
harmony, which is called the virtue of temperance. In turn, the virtue of
temperance preserves the virtue of prudence, which is the ability to make
decisions correctly. Prudence requires a real knowledge of the way things
were, and so requires memory, and from memory prudence comes to a correct
understanding of the way things are. These are cognitive elements of
prudence. Prudence also has a volitive element, which is the ability to
make a decision neither too rashly, nor too hesitantly. The interference
of uncontrolled appetites can obscure memory and understanding, and unduly
influence the action of the will. (23)
The traditional emphasis in asceticism has been on the two appetites that
are most closely related to human existence, the appetite for
self-preservation, which reaches its excess in gluttony, and the appetite
for the preservation of the species, which is deformed in the excess of
lust. The appetite for knowledge can also exceed its proper and rational
limits.
This involves a paradox. The appetite for knowledge would seem to be
reason itself. How could one act against reason in trying to become more
reasonable? The first consideration is that the desire for knowledge is in
a sense the strongest of human desires. We may consider Aristotle's
eudaimonian philosophy, his doctrine that all human action has happiness
for its final cause. Happiness cannot be the mere possession of something,
but implies that we know in a fully conscious way that we possess that
which makes us happy. (24). Aristotle also notes that all men by their
nature desire knowledge. We do not have a desire for knowledge merely as a
means to an end that is not knowledge, but we take pleasure in sensation
itself. Of all the senses, says Aristotle, vision is the one that affords
us the most pleasure, as it provides us with the most detail about things.
(25)(Aristotle,Metaphysics, I, i. 980a 22-980b 1. [Regresar])
How can the
desire for knowledge lead us astray?
story of how his friend Alypius attended the Roman gladiatorial games, and
was resolved to shut his eyes at the moment of killing. (26) He resolved
that even though his friends might bring his body to the games, they could
not force his mind to enjoy it. When the crowd cried with a large voice,
he could not resist, but opened his eyes, telling himself that although he
might look at the spectacle, he would still be above it and despise it in
his heart. However, his heart was also led to enjoy the spectacle, against
his resolution.
Truth is itself a good. Even the truth about an evil thing is good. The
purpose of the mind is to know the truth, and the relation of the mind to
reality called truth is also the first and most essential element of moral
knowledge. As Karol Wojtyla wrote in 1958, when he was a professor of
philosophy:
The principle that one should remain in harmony or agreement with reality,
both objective and subjective reality, in one's activity, is the gauge of
realism in the whole of practical philosophy, and in particular in ethics.
Ethical norms are based on reality.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!! The same faculty of reason, which in
its knowing attains to reality itself, also defines the principles of
activity. (27)
Anything which strikes at our cognitive relation to objective reality also
diminishes our ability to act as moral agents. If the use of electric
communication media, or even earlier media, such as the print media, in
any way change our relation in cognition to objective reality, we are
faced with a moral issue.! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!(TREBUIE SA CUNOASTEM LUMEA OBICTIV PT. CA SA FIM MORALI...ADEVARURILE DE CREDINT SI MORALE SUNT UNELEOBIECTIVE!!)
Marshall McLuhan was drawing from Aristotle when he observed that the
consciousness existed as a proportion or ratio between sensations. (28)
Aristotle cited the medical lore of his time in observing that sense
stimuli are painful when compared to a neutral or non-sensory state. (29)
To make this clear, when we leave a dark place, sudden light is painful to
us. However, we become habituated to a certain level of sensation, and so
to fall below that level, or to exceed that level becomes painful. At the
most basic level, we may be habituated to a certain temperature, or a
certain level of sound. At another level, we may be habituated to a
certain level or quality of information within our sense data. If we are
in the habit of reading newspapers every day, and then move to a foreign
country or go to the wilderness, the lack of news is at first painful.
After a time we adjust, and then when we return to the world of
information, we initially find the abundance of reported events painful,
until we readjust. Our dependence upon a constant flow of information from
all corners of the world represents a problem of addiction, and I would
venture to say that it may involve the same chemical mechanisms found in
drug addiction.! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !!!!!1
----! !The effects of the electronic media on the intellect through their effect
on the senses can be understood through analogy to another altered state
of consciousness, sleep.!!! The intellect is superior to the senses. The
lower powers of the senses are ordered to the intellect. (30) The
intellect in one sense rules the senses, as the will is the appetite of
the intellect. By volition, the intellect has the power within itself to
turn its attention towards or away from objects presented by the senses.
In another sense, the intellect in its operation is dependent upon the
senses. It receives the objects of its attention at first from the senses,
and the original objects in the intellect are based upon sensible thing.
Thus, when the senses are not fully functioning, the operation of the
intellect is hindered. (31) In various stages of sleep, the operation of
the intellect is impeded in various degrees, as the external and internal
senses are variously impeded. In deep sleep, the imagination does not
function at all. At another stage, the power of imagination is still
impeded, but partially functional, and distorted images may appear. The
images are more orderly as the imagination is more functional. In lighter
sleep, the common or unitive sense is partly operational, and the sleeper
begins to be able to distinguish between his dreams and real things. He
may sense the difference between the images of the dream and his own
thoughts. (32) The sleeper may even call up other images besides the
dream. A person who is memorizing something may arrange the mental images
in his mind. (33) Yet even in the stage of lucid dreaming, the intellect's
power of judgment in hindered. A person who tries to think in the logical
steps of a syllogism, says Thomas, will always recognize upon waking that
there is some flaw in his reasoning. Joseph Keogh theorized that his
students who watched television actually substituted television for sleep.
(34) When they were apparently thinking, the mental process was not the
linear and syllogistic process of the literate person, but the child of
television might watch an association of images in his mind in the same
passive way that he would view television. McLuhan's primary insight was
that a communication medium apart from the content of its overt messages
has a definite effect on the viewer. With regard to television, McLuhan's
observation was confirmed when scientists at General Electric discovered
that the brain waves of a television viewer are altered in the same way by
viewing television, without regard to the content. The measurable effect
of television was the same whether the person was viewing programming or
commercials. (35) The experiments were repeated by others who expected to
disprove McLuhan's hypothesis that "the medium is the message", only to
have the findings confirmed. (36) The brain reacts in the same distinctive
way to television as a medium in general. The variety of content has no
specific measurable effect.
Activists often express grave concern over the moral effects of the
content of television and other media. They are rightly concerned about
bad role models and a high incidence of violence and sexual sensuality.
They are also legitimately concerned about how affluence portrayed on
television can make people dissatisfied with their material condition. I
recognize these as legitimate concerns, but the primary concern should be
on the medium itself. The electronic media have in themselves a narcotic
effect on the abuser. In a day when governments and international bodies
battle the marketing of chemical substances, no one is mobilized to
counteract the negative effects of the electronic media. The electronic
media upsets normal community and family relations based on physical
contact and proximity, leading to an ersatz community where people have
the illusion of being angels. People in their relations are reduced to
being pieces of disembodied information without context or substance. We
do not distinguish between the use of morphine as an aid to inspiration
(Edgar Allan Poe), and its use as an escape from intolerable conditions
(the user in the American slum). The extensive use of such drugs is
dangerous and addictive in both cases. Yet we do not apply the same
prudence with regard to the media.
The level of sensation present in our lives affects our intellectual
judgment. Thomas Aquinas discusses two related cases of intellectual
debility arising from an imbalance in the sensory realm. The first is
dullness of the intellectual sense (hebetudo sensus), which arises from
immersion in the pleasures of food. The second is intellectual blindness
(caecitas mentis), which arises as the result of excessive sexual
pleasures. (37) The dulling of the intellectual sense stills leaves a
functioning intellect. However, what a pure heart can see quickly, the
dull of sense must labor to see. The intellect is lacking in penetrative
power. In the case of intellectual blindness, the intellect is completely
unable to consider spiritual realities.
If we extend this to the effect of the media, the media serve to provide
us with greater amounts of information. This is true of the printed media,
since the amount of information disseminated by books and newspapers is
far more than what one could learn from conversation in a pre-literate
society. It is more true of the electronic media, where we are provided
not only with the entire world through symbols, but we are provided with
the auditory and visual sensations of the whole world. The media would not
continue to grow unless there were an immense appetite for knowledge. Such
as it is today, that appetite is disordered. ? ? ????????/
If truth is a good, and even the truth about worthless or evil things is a
good compared to falsehood about the same things, then how can the truth
be a danger? The human mind has for its purpose to know the truth.
Aristotle taught that when we know something, in a way we become that
thing, and in a way we make that thing. (38) Knowledge is the intentional
existence of the known object in the knowing subject, where the object
forms or informs the subject as knower. Each person has but one mind, and
that mind can only know one thing at a time. If we think of several things
at once, it is only because we have grasped them in some unity, as in
knowing a whole, we know in a confused way the parts, or in knowing a
relation, we know in a confused way the things that come together in a
relational unity. (39) In knowledge itself, there is an hierarchy of
values. The highest value is to know God, and other values in knowledge
come below that. A mind distracted by lesser things cannot know God.?! !!
We may draw some practical conclusions.1 First, it is necessary to become
aware of the effect of any media upon our cognitive relation to reality,
and its effect upon our appetites. Second,2 we should recognize that
technology is a good thing in itself, as it is part of God's command to
man that he subdue the earth, but we should recognize that if we rely on
technology to solve all human problems, we are becoming idolaters.
Idolatry puts man at a lower level than the idol, and the result is
personal and social disorder. Third,3 the right use of technology means
that we should also counteract its attractions. Communications technology
concerns man's most basic appetite, the appetite to realize one's self
through knowledge. However, the mere quantity of information may distract
us from knowledge which is of true value. The most dangerous attitude is
that of one who sits in front of the television set or computer terminal
without a critical attitude. Since the machine is on, he takes up a
passive and receptive stance. The Christian practices of fasting and
abstinence are perhaps easy compared with consciously limiting of our use
of the media, yet that is required for mental and moral health.
Notas
15. Letters of Marshall McLuhan, selected and edited by Matie Molinaro,
Corrinne McLuhan, William Toye; Oxford University Press, 1987. The
Thomistic and Aristotelian ground of McLuhan's work is treated briefly in
Brigid Elson, In Defence of the Human Person: The Christian Humanism of
Marshall McLuhan, in The Canadian Catholic Review, May, 1994. [Regresar]
16. Aquinas De Veritate q. 18, a.1 ad 1. [Regresar]
17. Aquinas, Summa Theologica q. 93 a.7 ad. 4.; see also, Aquinas
Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate, q.1 a.3.: Thomas teaches that
the media in cognition are not in themselves, apart from other objects,
open to direct inspection. No one understands that he understands unless
first he understands something else which is intelligible. We cannot know
about the light of our mind unless first we are seeing something else in
that light. [Regresar]
18. Plato, Phaedrus, 274-275. [Regresar]
19. Aquinas Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate, q.2 a.4.
[Regresar]
20. Aquinas, Summa Theologica III q. 42, a.4. [Regresar]
21. I-II q. 106 a.1. [Regresar]
22. II-II q. 91, a.2. [Regresar]
23. see Joseph Pieper, The Four Cardinal Virtues, University of Notre Dame
Press, 1966. [Regresar]
24. cf. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c.xxv-xxxvii; Summa
Theologica I-II q. 1-4: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. X. [Regresar]
25. Aristotle,Metaphysics, I, i. 980a 22-980b 1. [Regresar]
26. Augustine, Confessions VI, viii. [Regresar]
27. Fr. Karol Wojty_a, Elementarz Etyczny (An Ethics Primer) Krakw 1979,
Znak, a collection of articles that appeared in the Tygodnik Powszechny
(Catholic Weekly( in 1957-58. My translation. [Regresar]
28. Aristotle, De Anima, II, ix-x. 422 a. 20 - 424a 35; McLuhan,
Understanding Media, ch. 4 "The Gadget Lover". [Regresar]
29. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, xiv. 1154b 6-10. [Regresar]
30. Summa Theologica I, q. 65. a. 2. [Regresar]
31. I q. 84, a. 8 ad 1. [Regresar]
32. I q. 84 a. 8 ad 2. [Regresar]
33. Aristotle, De Somniis, I 458b 15-20. [Regresar]
34. cf. Who Was Marshall McLuhan, ed. Barrington Nevitt and Maurice
McLuhan, Comprehensivist Publications, Toronto, 1994, p. 63. [Regresar]
35. Letters of Marshall McLuhan, ed. Matie Molinaro, Corinne McLuhan,
William Toye, Oxford University Press, 1987: Letter to Hugo McPherson,
Proffersor of English at McGill, 1970.. In the letter McLuhan refers to
findings that were later published in Journal of Advertising Research,
vol. II, no. 1, Feb. 1971, "Brain Wave Measurement of Media Involvement".
[Regresar]
36. cf. The Global Village, ch. 3 "Plato and Angelism". [Regresar]
37. Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II q. 15 a. 1-3; q. 46. a. 1-3.
[Regresar]
38. Aristotle, De Anima, III, v-vi. 430a 10-20. [Regresar]
39. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I q. 84 a. 4. [Regresar]
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