SPEECH ACT THEORY

SPEECH ACT THEORY

It is important to realize that pragmatics, as mentioned in the introductory section, is a different view on the same linguistic resources as the other components of linguistics look into. To understand the meaning of a linguistic message we certainly rely on the syntactic structure and lexical items, but it is a mistake to think that we operate only with this literal input to our understanding. We can recognize, for instance, when a writer (speaker) has produced a perfectly grammatical sentence from which we can derive a literal interpretation, but which we cannot say to have understood, simply because we need more information.

To illustrate this, let's take the following example (from Levinson, 1980:8), where the conjunction because is not only used to connect two clauses in a complex sentence. It is also used to introduce the reason for asking a question:

E.g.

What's the time, because I've got to go out at eight?

We can safely say that (cf. Levinson, 1980:8), in the example above, the structure of the sentence is not that normally associated with because as a logical connector. In other words, our understanding of the example is based, not on an interpretation of the sentence on the page, but 727g61h on our assumption that a reason is being expressed for an action performed in speaking

We will next look at the speech act theory, which is basic to any pragmatic approach to language.

I.           LANGUAGE AS ACTION

Inferring the function of what is said by considering its form and context is an ability which is essential for successful communication. Speech Act Theory provides us with a means of establishing the function of what is being said. The theory was developed from the basic belief that language is used to perform actions. Thus, its fundamental insights focus on how meaning and action are related to language. This is a position in which we shall be able to examine the structure of discourse both in terms of surface relations of form, and underlying relations of functions and acts.

Speech Act theory was formulated by the philosopher John Austin in a series of lectures now collected in a short book: How to Do Things With Words (1962). These ideas were further developed by the philosopher John Searle (1967, 1975), who added to them and presented them more systematically, and subsequently developed by other thinkers

Austin, his almost equally influential pupil H.P.Grice and a group of other philosophers working at Oxford came to be known as 'ordinary language philosophers'.

The ordinary language philosophers reacted against the view of such Oxford-based philosophers as Russell, (cf. Thomas, 1995:29) who believed that everyday language is somehow deficient, full of ambiguities, imprecision and contradictions. Their aim was to refine language, removing its perceived imperfections and to create an ideal language. The response of Austin and his group was to observe that ordinary people manage to communicate extremely efficiently with language just the way it is. Instead of striving to rid everyday language of its imperfections, he argued, we should try to understand how it is that people manage with it as it is.

II.  DECLARATIONS AND PERFORMATIVES

Speech acts are actions performed via utterances (apology, complaint, compliment, etc.) They apply to the speaker's communicative intention in producing an utterance. The speaker normally expects that his/her communicative intention will be recognized by the hearer. Both speaker and hearer are usually helped in this process by the circumstances surrounding utterances. These circumstances, including other utterances, are called speech events. In many ways, it is the nature of the speech event that determines the interpretation of an utterance as performing a particular speech act.

For example, the utterance This tea is really cold (Yule, 1996:48), functions as a complaint if it is uttered on a winter day, when the speaker reaches for a cup of tea, believing that it has been freshly made. It may also function as a praise if it is uttered on a really hot summer's day, with the speaker being given a glass of iced tea by the hearer.

Speech Act theory begins with the observation that there is a class of highly ritualistic utterances which carry no information about the world outside language at all because they refer to themselves.

E.g.:

a. I swear to. .

b. I sentence you to death.

c. I hereby open the Theater House.

d. I hereby name this ship 'Aurora'.

In the utterances above, saying the words and doing the action are the same thing. By uttering them, we perform the acts of swearing an oath, sentencing a criminal to death, opening a building, and naming a ship. In other words, the function of the utterance is created by the form. They are called declarations.

However, the utterance succeeds only if certain external conditions, or expected, appropriate conditions are fulfilled. For example (Cook, 1989:35) 'I sentence you to death' has to fulfill the following felicity conditions for the utterance to succeed:

the words must be uttered by someone with the necessary authority (a judge), in a country where there is death penalty, to a person who has been convicted of a particular crime;

they must be spoken not written, at the right time (the end of a trial), in the right place (in court)

Declarations are only a special case of a much commoner group of utterances called performatives for which saying is doing. Unlike the declarations, in the performatives, the related verbs (vow, arrest, declare, etc.) are not actually said. For example, in ordering someone to do something you can use the verb 'order', thus the utterance becoming an explicit performative:

E.g.

I order you to clean your boots

(Source: Cook, 1989:36)

But you can also use the imperative instead, and this is called implicit performative:

E.g.

Clean your boots!

The assumption is that underlying every utterance (U) there is a clause containing a performative verb (Vp) which makes the function explicit. The basic format of the underlying clause is:

I (hereby) Vp you (that) U

I hereby order you that you clean your boots.

the subject must be first person sg., + the adverb 'hereby', indicating that the utterance counts as an action by being uttered + a performative verb in the present tense + indirect object in the 2-nd per.sg. This underlying clause will always make explicit what may be implicitly expressed.

III.     FELICITY CONDITIONS

As we have already seen in the section above, for an utterance to perform a certain act, some appropriate conditions have to be fulfilled. Technically, they are called 'felicity conditions'. Speech act theory defines underlying conditions that must hold for an utterance to be used to realize a certain speech act.

Here is an example taken from Yule (1996:50-51): In everyday contexts among ordinary people, there are preconditions on speech acts. These are called general conditions on the participants, for example, that they can understand the language being used. There are also the so-called content conditions. For example, for a promise, the content of the utterance must be about a future event. The preparatory conditions for a promise require first, that the event will not happen by itself, and second, that the event will have a beneficial effect. Related to these conditions is the sincerity condition that, for a promise, the speaker genuinely intends to carry out the future action. Finally, there is the essential condition, which covers the fact that by the act of uttering a promise, I thereby intend to create an obligation to carry out the action as promised. In other words, the utterance changes the state from non-obligation to obligation.

Here is another example of the felicity conditions required by the act of 'ordering' (they are not detailed here in types of conditions) (cf. Cook, 1989:36):

1. the sender believes the action should be done

2. the receiver has the ability to do the action

3. the receiver has the obligation to do the action

4. the sender has the right to tell the receiver to do the action

If any one of these conditions is not fulfilled, the utterance will not function as an order. If the conditions do hold, then any reference by the sender to the action will be perceived as an order even if it is implicitly made.

Cook (1989:37) illustrates how a sergeant, speaking to the private, can utter any of the following and they will be perceived as an order:

E.g.

I think your boots need cleaning, Jones (Condition 1)

I'm bloody sure you can get your boots cleaner than that, Jones! (Condition 2)

You're supposed to come on to parade with clean boots, Jones! (Condition 3)

It's my job to see you've got cleaner boots than this! (Condition 4)

The private, for his part, may try to challenge the felicity conditions invoked, and, if he succeeds, he will take away the status of 'order' from the utterance:

E.g.:

Don't you think having a well-oiled rifle is more important?

I've been scrubbing all morning and they won't come any cleaner.

I didn't see that in the standing orders, sergeant.

The Captain told me it was all right.

In armies the power relations are so clear, and the rights and obligations of the participants so firmly established that these comments are likely to be punished. It rarely happens that explicit ordering and challenging take place.

IV. UNDERLYING FORCE (AUSTIN)

Austin has shown that on any occasion, the action performed by producing an utterance will consist of three related acts:

1. locutionary act: the basic act of utterance, producing a meaningful linguistic expression. At this level, the locution is what the words say.

2. illocutionary act: performed via the communicative force of an utterance, the function that we have in mind when we produce an utterance, what the words do. This is also known as the illocutionary force of an utterance.

3. perlocutionary act: the effect you intend your utterance to have on the hearer. For example, the perlocutionary effect of the utterance It's hot in here might be the hearer going to the window and opening it. This is also known as the perlocutionary effect of an utterance.

Austin suggests in fact that the words are determined by the intention of the speaker. He also gets into extremely fine detail as to certain verbs that can be used to perform a specific act. So, for a speech act to succeed, all three levels have to be taken into consideration: it must be minimally understood by hearer, the words uttered do something, and the words are determined by the intention of the speaker.

The most discussed dimension is that of the illocutionary acts, because the same locutionary act can have different illocutionary force, or function, as we have already seen.

An important implication of taking the speech acts as the basic unit of language analysis is that it allows researchers see that there is no one-to-one match between function (illocutionary force) and grammatical form (type of clause). For example, one can ask for a glass of water using an interrogative ('Can I have.?'), an imperative ('Give me.!'), a declarative ('I want.').

Speech Act theory has had a tremendous impact upon communicative language teaching and syllabus design. Thus, communicative competence includes not only the mastery of grammar and lexicon but also how speech acts, such as greetings, compliments, apologies, invitations and complaints are to be given, interpreted and responded to.

Moreover, the upshot is not always confined to words. Here is an example (Cook, 1989:40) from a court in Oxford, which heard a case concerning a fight in a Chinese take-away. A man picked up a bottle of sauce on his way out, without paying for it. The owner picked up a metal rolling pin, whereas the man took off his metal belt. The jury were asked to decide whether either or both of these actions could be interpreted as a threat.

V. TAXONOMY OF SPEECH ACTS (SEARLE)

The practical problem with any analysis based on identifying explicit performatives is that, in principle, we simply do not know how many performative verbs there are in any language. That is why, some general classification of types of speech acts are usually used. Discovering the number and categories of illocutionary acts is an important part of speech act theory.

Searle proposes five classes of speech acts: declarations (e.g., appointing), representatives (e.g. asserting), expressives (e.g. thanking), directives (e.g. requesting), and commissives (e.g. promising). The principle according to which he differentiates the five categories concerns the illocutionary force of the act. This is derived from the essential condition of an act (the condition that defines what the act 'counts' as). We thus have the following categories of speech acts (examples taken from Yule, 1996:53-54):

Declarations: speech acts that change the world via their utterance.

E.g.:

Priest: I now pronounce you husband and wife.

Referee: You're out.

Jury Foreman: We find the defendant guilty.

Representatives: speech acts that the speaker believes to be the case or not.

For example,

statements of fact (The earth is round)

assertions (Pragmatics deals with language in context)

descriptions (It was a rainy day)

In using a representative, the speaker makes words fit the world (of belief).

Expressives: speech acts that state what the speaker feels (psychological states). For example, expressing pleasure, pain, likes, dislikes, joy, sorrow, etc. They can be caused by something the speaker does or the hearer does, but they are about the speaker's experience:

E.g.

a. I'm really sorry.

b. Congratulations!

c. Oh that's delicious!

In using expressives the speaker makes the words fit the world (of feeling).

Directives: speech acts that speakers use to get someone else do something. They express what the speaker wants. For example, commands, orders, requests, suggestions, etc. and can be positive or negative:

E.g.

a. Gimme a cup of tea. Make it strong.

b. Could you lend me a pencil, please.

c. Watch the step.

In using a directive, the speaker attempts to make the world fit the words (via the hearer).

Commissives: speech acts that the speakers use to commit themselves to some future action. They express what the speaker intends. For example, promises, threats, refusals, pledges and can be performed by the speaker alone or as a member of a group:

E.g.

a. I'll be back.

b. I'm going to get it right next time.

c. We will not do that.

In using a commissive, the speaker undetakes to make the world fit the words (via the speaker).

VI. DIRECT AND INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS

A different approach to distinguishing types of speech acts can be made on the basis of structure, provided by the three basic sentence types in English which relate to the three general communicative functions (Yule, 1996:54):

Utterance   Sentence type Function

You wear a seat belt. Declarative Statement

Do you wear a seat belt? Interrogative Question

Wear a seat belt! Imperative Command/Request

Whenever there is a direct relationship between a structure and a function, we have a direct speech act. Whenever there is an indirect relationship between structure and function we have an indirect speech act.

For example, in English most requests are done by using declaratives:

E.g.

It's cold outside:

The utterance above, used as a statement, is a direct speech act (I hereby tell you that it is cold outside), used as a command/request, it is an indirect speech act (I hereby request you that you close the window).

One of the most common types of indirect speech acts in English has the form of interrogative, which is not typically used to ask a question (we don't expect only an answer, we expect an action).

E.g.:

Could you pass the salt?

Would you open this?

Indirect speech acts are generally associated with greater politeness in English than direct speech acts.

The usefulness of speech act analysis is in illustrating the kinds of things we can do with words and identifying some of the conventional utterance forms we use to perform specific actions. However, there are several problems with the speech act theory. For example, many speech act theorists fail to take proper account of indeterminacy (i.e. by leaving the force of an utterance unclear, the speaker may leave the hearer the opportunity to choose between one force and another). Thus, the utterance If I were you I'd leave town straight away, can be interpreted according to the context as a piece of advice, a warning, or a threat.

Also, speech acts are often played out over a number of turns, so we need to look at more extended interaction to understand how these actions are carried out and interpreted within speech events.

In this chapter we have seen how utterances perform actions, how speakers can mean considerably more than their words say. In the next chapter we shall address the question of how hearers get from what is said to what is meant.

VII. SUMMARY

Speech acts are actions performed via utterances (apology, complaint, compliment, etc.) They apply to the speaker's communicative intention in producing an utterance. The speaker normally expects that his/her communicative intention will be recognized by the hearer. Both speaker and hearer are usually helped in this process by the circumstances surrounding utterances. These circumstances, including other utterances, are called speech events.

For an utterance to perform a certain act, some appropriate conditions have to be fulfilled. Technically, they are called 'felicity conditions'. Speech act theory defines underlying conditions that must hold for an utterance to be used to realize a certain speech act.

The communicative force of an utterance

• locutionary act: the basic act of utterance, producing a meaningful linguistic expression.
• illocutionary act: performed via the communicative force of an utterance, the function that we have in mind when we produce an utterance.
• perlocutionary act: the effect you intend your utterance to have on the hearer.

Taxonomy of speech acts

• Declarations: speech acts that change the world via their utterance.
• Representatives: speech acts that the speaker believes to be the case or not.
• Expressives: speech acts that state what the speaker feels (psychological states).
• Directives: speech acts that speakers use to get someone else do something. They express what the speaker wants.
• Commissives: speech acts that the speakers use to commit themselves to some future action. They express what the speaker intends.

Direct and indirect speech acts

Whenever there is a direct relationship between a structure and a function, we have a direct speech act. Whenever there is an indirect relationship between structure and function we have an indirect speech act.

What are the felicity conditions for the following utterances to function and to what extent do they vary from culture to culture? (Source: Cook, 1989)

1. I pronounce that they be Man and wife.

2. I name this ship Queen Elisabeth.

3. You are under arrest.

4. I absolve you from all your sins.

5. I declare the said person duly elected to Parliament.

Look at the following utterances and try to determine what might  have been their illocutionary force:

1. Open the window, will you?

2. It's very cold in here, isn't it?

3. I'm sorry for having broken the glass..

4. I promise to come tomorrow.

5. Somebody's messed up my things in here.

How does an explicit performative differ from an implicit performative? In what circumstances might one be used as opposed to the other?

. Look at the following transcripts of exchanges between a husband and a wife. How does A exploit ambiguity in the illocutionary force of what is said? Do the utterances which explicitly formulate the upshot refer to the illocutionary or perlocutionary force? (Source: Cook, 1989)

Exchange 1.

A: Are you planning to do it this afternoon?

B: (angrily) Well WHEN this afternoon?

A: (with injured innocence) I'm just asking whether you'll be able to do it this afternoon.

Exchange 2.

B: Oh no, we haven't got the TV programme.

A: Go and get one then.

B: Go and get one! I've just come in.

A: Well if you don't go I'll go.

B: That's blackmail.

A: It's not blackmail, it's just a FACT.

Comment on the following utterance. Does it qualify as a promise? Why (not)? (Source: Mey, 1993:127)

I promise not to keep this promise.

Suppose you come across a street sign whose text says: (Source: Mey, 1993:127)

DO NOT READ THIS SIGN

What speech act are we dealing with?

Can one take this seriously? Why not?

What is the problem with the following speech acts. Do they all suffer from the same irregularity, or are they irregular different ways? Can you think of any conditions that make any of these speech acts acceptable? (Source: Mey, 1993:127)

I promise (hereby) to set fire to your house.

I hereby warn you that you will be awarded the Nobel prize in literature.

WRNING: Your lawn will turn brown in November

Consider the following text, found on a package of American brewers' yeast in the 1920s: (Source: Mey, 1993:127)

Do not mix the contents of this package with 2 qts of lukewarm water

Do not add 1 lb of sprouted barley

Do not put in a warm spot (74 degrees) for 7-10 days

Do not skim

Do not put mixture in copper pot and heat

Do not condense vapors

Do not consume end product

Do not get caught

What speech acts are these (if any)

The following exchange occurred during an English lesson where the teacher had asked his pupils to write complimentary notes to each other. M, one of the students, is reading aloud the message he had received. Comment on the speech acts involved in the exchange, and how the other participants (T=teacher; Ser=pupil) interpret the message (Source, Coposescu, 2003:165):

CR 338-343

M:  somebody tells me that er Mihai means who's the king. Ok, and

er somebody tells me sometimes I have to know what to say because I might hurt someone. OK, thank you.

T: wow, that wasn't very nice. What about (.) are there some complimentary ones?

Ser: no, they're actually nice

T: oh really? [.]

In groups, take a textbook for teaching English and look for ways in which language functions are dealt with.

Think of ways of expressing apologies and request in Romanian and in English.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blun-Kulka, S., 1987, Indirectness and politeness in

Requests: same or different?, in Journal of Pragmatics, 11, 131-146

Gibbs, R., W., 1988, Conversational sequences and

preference for indirect speech acts, in Discourse Processes, 11, 101-116

Trosborg, A., 1987, Apology strategies in natives/non

Natives, in Journal of Pragmatics, 11, 147-167