ABOUT INTENTIONALITY AND ABOUT THE IREDUCIBILITY OF LOGIC TO CAUSALITY

ABOUT INTENTIONALITY AND ABOUT THE IREDUCIBILITY OF LOGIC TO CAUSALITY

ABOUT

INTENTIONALITY

Event: Peter moved from the spatial point A to the spatial point B.

What is the explanation of this event?

Peter moved to open a door that is placed near to B? That is, the explanation is intentional?

This event is an effect or a succesions of effects. Its movement is caused mainly by the contraction and relaxation of its muscles. That is, its movement is muscular: he cannot move by itself other way than by muscles. Until now, one thing is obvious: the main cause of its movement is muscular. Not an intention caused its motion. The direct cause of its motion is muscular. But the muscles were theirselves under the influence of other cause.

The Nervous System caused their selective contraction and/or relaxation. The Nervous System stimulates the muscles and this stimulation is causal. Sure, Peter maybe has had an intention, but this intention does not influenced its movement directly. What can be the place of the intention in explanation?

Suposse that, before its movement, Peter created in its mind a set 636q1610g of possible actions and, using its anticipation, memory, and judgement, their possible consequences, for obtaining an result-aim. But then he had already in its mind the result-aim.

This result-aim supossed an a previous evaluation and selection.

No mater how long would be this process of imagination, anticipation, recalling, evaluation, selection, analysis, synthesis etc. finaly he can take a decision to realize, by stimulating the motor neuronal system which stimulates the muscles, an individual action. Until to a point we observe clearly a causal chain (decision, the motor neuronal system, muscle), but then the things are ultra-complex. Though that the conscious contents are effects, between them, it seems that, are not causal connections. Yes, it is said that, however, memory can have an influence from the past in the present, but it seems that such influence is too weak. If between the conscious states that succede in the conscious flow would be causal relations, then every present conscious state would be an effect of the previous state and the explanation of human behaviour would be a simple causal chain. However, it seems that, no one would accept that a present conceptual representation would CAUSE the next representation. The representation of the principle of justice cannot be a cause of the activation of the motor system.

However, either we think in ourselves or we explore the world we manipulate conscious contents, creating and changing conscious contents. This free exploration, control, creation, and changing is causal, I suposse. He cannot be other way than causal. We freely create, select, evaluate, judge, and decide.

We can imagine a blue high sky, but this image we constructed in our mind, is the effect of our creation.

We cannot control our capacities other way than in a causal way, I consider. This metacontrol should be causal. The cognitive system is constituted not only by cognitive contents, but also by the cognitive capacities and operations. The cognitive system, as a whole,

if it is separated by the motor neuronal system, can be a cause of the activation of TMNS. However, a representation cannot be a cause

of, cannot stimulate, it seems, TMNS.

A human individual can imagine an action and its physical consequence-effect, then to realize that action hoping or wanting to obtain the imagined physical consequence-effect. He can imagine a long chain of actions that he hope that will cause the wanted effect and then to realize the actions to obtain the desired effect. If he believes that action A will cause the effect B, and if he want to obtain B, he can decide to do A. But between the representation of

A and the representation of B is not a causal relation, but only the representation of a causal relation.

The muscular system is activated by TMNS, not by A , B, or A&B. And all this representations (A, B, A&B) are creations-effects. Though that this premises do not act on decission in a causal way, that is, they are not the cause of an individual decision, a rational decision and maybe

any non-instinctual decision, no mater if it is good or wrong, is a function or it is implied by

some contents. Suposse the following situation: if we would have a visual system in itself, whitout memory and influences from other higher order, then its phenomena would the final output at the top of the visual system.

The phenomenon from a t1 cannot cause the the phenomenon from t2, if every possible phenomenon is only the effect of the integration of the information from the lower levels. In the previous situation the phenomenal changing can be caused only receiving different informations from the lower level. The relations between the links of the

chain of conscious contents can be non-causal, though that every link is an effect.

danila ioan marian

ABOUT THE

PHILOSOPHICAL

SENSE OF IREDUCIBILITY OF THE MENTAL TO THE SUB-MENTAL

I found this principle of this ireducibility on other philosophical principle: the whole can be more than the sum of its parts. By the last principle it is suggested the importance of the relational structure. The last principle is valide in many sciences (e.g., not only in psychology or in physics or in biology or cosmology etc.).

Only in mathematics the whole (e.g., a number) can be only the sum of its parts. But even in the mathematics (e.g., geometry) there can be situations in which the whole has

some different characteristics than its parts (e.g., a square can be divided in two rectangular surfaces, but only the square has equal sides.

That is, by the principle it is considered that the relational structure of the whole can determ (logicaly or causaly) at the level of the whole properties or characteristics that its parts do not share. The whole can have non-additive characteristics.

To express all this

in an ultra-intelligible way, suposse the true of the following:

The micro-physical parts (micro-particle) and the micro-physical relations (micro-forces or micro-carriers of forces) are made finaly by a common entity (either divisible or non-fisionable)

That is, the whole material reality would be made by a common entity

( though that the

empty space and this entity

are not made by other under-entity, but this is other duality problem).

Now can be suggested in the most intelligible way the possible ireducibility: If we would have many different objects made by the same quantity of that common entity, how would be they different?

How would differe a brain

from a rock, a glass, a book?

How would differe a brain from the same quantity of natural manure?

Only by structure, cause the sum of their parts are identical.

In the same sense, the human brain is structured by cells, but the brain as a whole and its networks has/have properties which is individual cells do not share (e.g., rational decision, logical thinking, freedom of will etc.).

This is the way in which the mental is not reducible at submental, though that it is conditioned and cannot exist without its submental. It is ultr-intelligible that the human brain cannot exists whithout cells, but the brain is not only a big neuron, cause

its capacities are not only additive.

A very complex logical

propositional form can be realisable

or tautological (a characteristic of the whole), but it can contain a contradictory sub-form:

[(a ~a) (b ~b)]=C

The whole C can be only true, but its part (a ~a) can be only false.

And a logical complex propositional form can be contradictory, though that contain tautological sub-propositions. That is, the whole can have different characteristics than its part. That is, the actual value of the

whole can be different than the actual value of its part, though that the value of the whole is conditioned by the value of its parts and on the relations between its parts. But the relations are not mathematical. The value of the whole is not equal with the sum of the values of parts.